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It is important that engineering and management accept the need for an availability 
requirement that is derived with its influencing attributes. It is the intent of this paper to 
provide the visibility of relationships of these major attribute drivers (variables) to each 
other and the resultant system inherent availability. Also important to provide bounds of the 
variables providing engineering the insight required to control the system's engineering 
solution, e.g., these influencing attributes become design requirements also. These variables 
will drive the need to provide integration of similar discipline functions or technology 
selection to allow control of the total parts count. The relationship of selecting a reliability 
requirement will place a constraint on parts count to achieve a given availability 
requirement or if allowed to increase the parts count will drive the system reliability 
requirement higher. They also provide the understanding for the relationship of mean repair 
time (or mean down time) to maintainability, e.g., accessibility for repair, and both the mean 
time between failure, e.g., reliability of hardware and availability. The concerns and 
importance of achieving a strong availability requirement is driven by the need for 
affordability, the choice of using the two launch solution for the single space application, or 
the need to control the spare parts count needed to support the long stay in either orbit or on 
the surface of the moon. Understanding the requirements before starting the architectural 
design concept will avoid considerable time and money required to iterate the design to meet 
the redesign and assessment process required to achieve the results required of the 
customer's space transportation system. In fact the impact to the schedule to being able to 
deliver the system that meets the customer's needs, goals, and objectives may cause the 
customer to compromise his desired operational goal and objectives resulting in considerable 
increased life cycle cost of the fielded space transportation system. 
Nomenclature 
A1	 = inherent availability 
MTBF = mean time between failure (hours) 
M1TR = mean time to repair (hours) 
X	 = failure rate or the reciprocal of the MTBF 
r	 = number of failures 
N	 = total parts count 
t	 = number of times the event is exposed 
I. Introduction 
I
T is essential that management and engineering understand the need for a derived availability requirement for the 
customer's space transportation system. It is also essential to provide engineering and management the visibility 
of the several variables that determine availability required to enable the object's key goals and objectives. This 
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relationship of the variables driving the availability capability needs must be understood by all decision makers 
involved. This paper will address the inherent availability which only addresses the mean downtime as that mean 
time to repair or the time to determine the failed article, remove it, install a replacement article and verify the 
functionality of the repaired system. Also with inherent availability the mean uptime will only consider the mean 
time between failures (other availability definitions consider this as mean time between maintenance - preventive 
and corrective maintenance) that requires the repair of the system to be functional. It is also essential that 
management and engineering understand all influencing attribute relationships to each other and to the resultant 
inherent availability requirement. Fig. I provides a visual influence diagram of these attribute relationships to each 
other and to the resultant availability requirement. This visibility will provide the decision makers with the 
understanding necessary to place constraints on the design definition for the major drivers that will determine the 
inherent availability, safety, reliability, maintainability, and the life cycle cost of the fielded system provided the 
customer. This inherent availability requirement may be driven by the need to use a multiple launch approach to 
placing humans on the moon or the desire to control the number of spare parts required to support long stays in 
either orbit or on the surface of the moon or mars. 
INHERENT RELIABILITY	 r - - - - - - - I 
DEPENDABILITY	 UNPLANNED-----I 
NN ORK	 1 1-01 ACCESSIBILITY 
WORK 
SYS& PARTS COUNT I  
Figure 1. Availability influence diagram 
II. Background 
There are three types of availability, e.g., operational availability, achieved availability, or inherent availability. 
The basic definition of availability is equal to the mean uptime divided by the sum of the mean uptime plus the mean 
downtime. The major difference is the inclusiveness of the functions within the mean downtime and the mean 
uptime. The definitions of operational availability include the replacement hardware supply or maintenance delays 
and other non-design factors in the mean downtime. Also with inherent availability the mean uptime will only 
consider the mean time between failures (achieved availability definition considers this as mean time between 
maintenance - preventive and corrective maintenance that requires the repair of the system to be functional). For the 
purposes of this paper we will only be discussing inherent availability (A), Eq. 1, 
	
A=MTBF/(MTBF+MTTR) 	 (1) 
where MTBF is the mean time between failure and MTTR is the mean time to repair. MTBF is simply the time 
between any failures occurring in the system, e.g., the system no longer supports its intended function. MTTR is the 
total down time, e.g., that mean time to repair or the time to determine the failed article, remove it, install a 
replacement article and verify the functionality of the repaired system. Stating an availability requirement by itself 
will not accomplish the intended simple requirement. There are several major attribute drivers (variables) that 
influence or enable the achievement of the required availability. These major attributes are reliability, 
maintainability, and total parts count. This availability requirement and its influencing attributes must be developed 
together with them all becoming requirements. The relationship of these variables and the resultant achieved 
inherent availability must be understood by both engineering and management to enable the achievement of the 
customer's needs, goals and objectives. 
HI. Understanding the Availability and its Influencing Attributes Relationships 
A. Defining Inherent Availability and its Influencing Attributes 
We will address inherent availability from a design perspective. By emphasizing the importance of the key 
attributes that influence availability, we can control the need to perform unplanned work during long space missions 
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or during the critical phases of the launch operation. Reliability or a metric of reliability (MTBF) by itself does not 
equate to availability. Availability is also influenced by maintainability or MTTR. As the reliability value of the 
system is increased the MTTR value becomes larger with a fixed availability requirement. Therefore, if the mission 
cannot accommodate the down time from a single failure from this projected MTTR requirement, there is a need for 
selecting a higher availability requirement. If the opposite approach is taken to reduce the reliability values desired 
to reduce the MTTR, then the projected number of failures would increase which requires more replacement parts, 
but resulting in the same total down time to maintain a working system. However, the total impact to the mission 
will be much greater, e.g., logistics impact from more parts failures and or the ability to provide the replacement 
parts when needed resulting in increased life cycle cost. Table 1 below illustrates this relationship between the 
requirements for MTFR and MTBF for different availability value requirements. 
Table 1. Availability requirement as a function of system reliability requirement and mean time to 
repair requirement in hours and for a fixed mission time 
Availability (A) 













However, to understand the relationship of increased hardware failures to reduced reliability, we need to look at the 
probability of failures to total hardware parts count with respect to systems reliability. Poisson distribution can be 
used for predicting the number of failure events over a specific time. Eq. 2 is used to determine the probability of 
success of achieving the failure control desired. Fig. 2 and Table 2 illustrate this relationship of system complexity 
(parts count) to system reliability yielding the probability of success of controlling hardware failures by design. 
Pr =	 r[_it (N2t) /(n!)1	 (2) 
where using the "CUMULATIVE POISSON PROCESS" the probability of the number of failures can be 
projected. Where r is the number of failures, N is the total parts count, X is the failure rate or reciprocal of the 
MTBF, t is the number of times the event is exposed and Pr is the probability of occurrence. 
N = 3 system elements 
P(no. repairs r) .999 
using Poisson process 
30,- 
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I .	 / distribution	 i
.2 
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I	 10	 100	 1000
System Element MTBF (No. Missions) 
Figure 2. Notional example of Parametric Maintainability and Reliability Data 
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Table 2. System Complexity (parts count) shown as a function system reliability and probability of 
success of controlling failures to 1 or less per event in time 
System Complexity - Parts Count (N) Constraint 
System	 MTBF=	 20000	 10000	 2000	 1000	 500	 100	 50 
Reliability(R)	 -I/In R
0.9500 19.496 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 3.629% 27.428 
0.9800 49.498 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.046% 40.055% 73.203 
0.9900 99.499 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.048% 3.959% 73.391% 90.903 
0.9940 166.166 0.000% 0.000% 0.008% 1.708% 19.780% 87.750% 96.286 
0.9950 199.500 0.000% 0.000% 0.049% 4.001% 28.601% 90.942% 97.338 
0.9960 249.500 0.000% 0.000% 0.298% 9.099% 40.492% 93.823% 98.241 
0.9980 499.500 0.000% 0.000% 9.129% 40.546% 73.539% 98.244% 99.531 
0.9990 999.500 0.000% 0.050% 40.574% 73.557% 90.972% 99.532% 99.879 
0.9998 4999.500 9.155% 40.595% 93.844% 98.247% 99.532% 99.980% 99.995 
0.9999 9999.500 40.598% 73.574% 98.248% 99.532% 99.879% 99.995% 99.999 
Probability of Success for 1 or Less Parts Failing per Event 
When evaluating total parts count, this can be considered in two different ways. If the concern is for 
affordability, the total parts count considers all components that could be considered to have a failure mode. Any 
parts failure will result in added maintenance burden and result in added life cycle cost. However, if the concern is 
for achieving a successful launch on time or for the in-space application for long term space flight, only the critical 
components (parts) should be considered that would impact the successful mission accomplishment. Because of this 
difference in objectives, the designer will probably want to perform both evaluations to allow the achievement of 
both objectives which can be controlled and accomplished by the design process. These attribute relationships and 
availability can be made more visible by examining scenario examples. 
B. An example of Space Transportation Application 
Let's work an example case through this process to allow better visibility of using these aids. Let's assume we 
will select a system with 0.999 system reliability and a desired availability of 98%, but the allowed MTTR if we 
experience a failure will only be allowed to be - 5 hours. We can easily see that the predicted M1TR for our 
example is 20.4 hours at this 98% availability; therefore, we must either select a higher availability or lesser system 
reliability. Using Table 3 we can see when using this 0.999 system reliability that the availability requirement needs 
to be adjusted to be 99.5% or better. The other option would be to select a lesser system reliability of 0.995 to retain 
this MTTR requirement of 5 hours. If we were to make this lesser reliability selection, we need to determine the 
probability of experiencing hardware failures. Now it can be seen from Table 4 that the system complexity 
requirement would be constrained to - 50 parts count maximum at a 95% or better probability of success. 
Table 3. Availability shown highlighted as a function of system reliability and mean time to repair in hours 
Availability (A) 














Again it can be seen from Table 4 that it may be desirable to increase the systems reliability if it is unreasonable to 
constrain the parts count below 1000 with a probability of success greater than 95% (- 98.25%). If we select a 
systems reliability of 0.9998 to accommodate the 1000 parts count, we will again need to adjust the availability 
requirement value to 99.9% to retain the MTTR requirement to - 5 hours; however, this assumes the time of the 
event is the full MTBF of- 5000 hours for the availability of 99.9% and the systems reliability of 0.9998. 
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Table 4. System Complexity (parts count) constraint example shown as a function of system reliability 
(0.999, 0995, & 0.9998) and 95% probability of success of controlling failures to 1 or less / event 
Note: Red Font Cells in Row 6 & 7 are variables and can be 
changed to meet your application's needs. 
Maximum number of failures = I or less (r) =	 I	 I	 I N 5 Let  
Failure rate of each system element (). for Lambda) = -mR	 and  1	 I 
A family of curves can be created for the Probability of Success for 1 or Less Parts 
failing per event with System Reliability Values of: (R) = 0.95 to 0.9999 
System Complexity - Parts Count (N) Constraint 
System MTBF 5000 2000	 1000	 500	 400	 300	 100 50 
Reliability(R) -1/In R 
0.9500 19.496 0000% 0000%	 0.000%	 0.000%	 0.000%	 0.000%	 3 62 27 4 
0.9800 49.498 0.000% 0.000%	 0.000°/a	 0.046%	 0.281%	 1.647%	 40 
0.9900 99.499 0, D00% 0.000%	 0.048%	 3.9591/6 	 9.011%	 '9 590	 -. 
0.9940 166.166 0000% 0.008%	 1.708%	 19.780% 96.286% 
0.9950 199.500 0.000% 0.049%	 4001% 28.601% 97.338% 
0.9960 249.500 000% 0298%	 9099%	 40,4924/6 
:rv303%
98.241% 
0.9980 499.500 .: I	 98.244% 99.531% 
0.9990 999.500  99.532°!, 99.879% 
0.9998 4999.500 1 I	 98.247%	 99.532%	 99.697%	 99.827°!,	 99.980°!, 99.995% 
0.9999 9999.500 !. 98.248%	 99.532% 99.879%	 99.922%	 99.956%	 99.995% 99.999% 
Probability of Success for 1 or Less Parts Failing per Event 
For the purposes of determining the availability of the system, if the time of the event of interest is only the last 45 
days (1080 hours) of the total MTBF of- 5,000 hours, we need to adjust the value fort in our model to 0.216 (the 
fraction of the MTBF). This 45 days target may represent a desired total time for receiving the hardware at the 
launch site, integrating the major elements, servicing the consumables, installing and connecting any ordinance, and 
launching the space transportation system into space. Visibility of evaluation for the 45 days can be seen in Table 5 
where choosing a reliability of 0.995 (MTBF of 200 hours) would restrict the parts count to -. 300 with a 
probability of success of 95% or better where selecting the reliability at 0.9998 (MTBF of -. 5,000 hours) would 
allow an excess of 5,000 total parts count and achieve a probability of success of having 1 or less failures during this 
45 days of interest with a probability of success of 95% or better. Now that we have been working to achieve one or 
less failures, the design must accommodate this total repair time by providing accessibility during any part of the 45 
days without any significant preparation. Experience has shown that hardware replacement that can be replaced in 
a couple of hours before the vehicle is integrated, but if the failure occurs late in the launch pad servicing, the repair 
can take as much as 5 days because of the lack of accessibility for corrective action. With the availability 
requirement at 99.9% the MTTR requirement is - 5 hours as seen from Table 3. 
Table 5. System Complexity (parts count) example shown as a function of system reliability (0.999, 0995, 
& 0.9998) and 95% probability of success of controlling failures to 1 or less per event in time; 
however, event time is reduced to only 45 days (1080 hours) of the total MTBF of - 5,000 hours. 
Note: Red Font Cells in Row 5 & 6 are variables and can be 
changed to meet your application's needs. 
Maximum number of failures = 1 or less (r) =	 I	 I NLt  
Failure rate of each system element (A for Lambda) = -lnR	 and t=I	 1. 
A family of curves can be created for the Probability of Success for I or Less Parts failing per 
event with System Reliability Values of: (R) = 0.95 to 0.9999 
System Complexity - Parts Count (N) Constraint 
System MThF - 20000 10000	 5000	 1000	 500	 400	 300 100 
Reliability (K) -14n R 
0.9500 19.496 0000% 0.000%	 0.000%	 0.0199 
0.9800 49.498 1 000% 0.000%	 0.000%	 6.828:.  
0.9900 99.499 1 Th00% 0.000%	 0.023%	 36.17 97.95 
0.9940 166.166 .00% 0.003%	 1.128%	 62€ 99.22 
0.9960 199.500 .1100%
__ 
C '23°	 2 99	 95.739% 99.45 
0.9960 249.500 .10% I 95.224%	 97.158% 99.64 
0.9980 499.500  97.974%	 98.666%	 99.228% 99.96 
0.9990 999.500 97.976%	 99.457%	 99,647%	 99.799% _ 99.97 
0.9998 4999.500 I 97.977%	 99.909%	 99.977%	 99.985%	 99.992% 99.99 
0.9999 9999.500 -	 I 97.977%	 99.457% 99.977%	 99.994%	 99.998%	 99.998% 100.00 
Probabilit y of Success for I or Less Parts Failing per Event 
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C. An example of long term In-Space Application 
Let us now look at an example of long term exposure in space without the opportunity to provide re-supply of 
any hardware from earth. This might be considered as a trip to another planet like Mars where the trip time may be 
between two and three years. First we must choose a MTBF to accommodate the application such as 25,000 hours 
(reliability of 0.99996). We can now see from Table 6 that the total parts count must be constrained to only 250 if 
we assume there are no failures allowed (Availability of 100%) and at a probability of success of 99% or 1,275 total 
parts count if we allow the probability of success to go to 95%. 
Table 6. System Complexity (parts count) example shown as a function of system reliability at (0.99996) 
and 99% and 95% probability of success of controlling failures to 0 per event in time; however, 
the event time is long term in space of 2 to 3 years (-25,000 hours) or the total MTBF. 
Note: Red Font Cells in Row 5 & 6 are variables and can be changed 
to meet your applications needs. 
Maximum number of failures = 0 or less (r) 
=	 I	 I N*L*t	 t = 
Failure rate of each system element (A for Lambda) = - lnR	 and t =1	 I 
A family of curves can be created for the Probability of Success for 0 Parts 

























System Complexity - Parts Count (N) Constraint 
5000	 2000	 1275	 500	 400	 300	 250	 50 
0.000 1. 0 000 1 O 11 .000% 0.0009'. 0.000% 0 7.694% 
0.000% ..... 0.000% 0.004% 0.031% 0.233% 0 2 7 36.417% 
0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.657% 1.795% 4.904% 8.106%, 60.501% 
0.000% 0.001% 0.047% 4.934% 9.006% 16.441% 22.212% 74.015% 
0.000% 0.004% 0.168% 8.157% 13.466% 22.229% 
0.004% 1.824% 7.788% 36.751% 44.897% 54.846 
0.672% 13.52' 1019% 
2P 784% P,7 o:






 of Success for 0 Parts Failing per Event 
But if this application allows one failure to occur, it can be seen from Table 7 that the total part count constraint can 
be raised to 3,700 at 99% probability of success or up to 8,800 at 95% probability of success. The problem now 
becomes one of determining which hardware parts to take with this mission. Suggest the solution might be 
determined to take all 3,700 or 8,800 parts as spares to be sure to have the correct one. 
Table 7. System Complexity (parts count) example shown as a function of system reliability at (0.99996) 
and 99% and 95% probability of success of controlling failures to 1 or less per event in time; 
however, the event time is long term in space of 2 to 3 years (-25,000 hours) or the total MTBF. 
Note: Red Font Cells in Row 6 & 7 are variables and 
can be changed to meet your application's needs. 
Maximum number of failures = I or less (r) =	 I	 I N*L*t 
Failure rate of each system element (A for Lambda) = - lnR	 and t =1	 I 
A family of curves can be created for the Probability of Success for I or Less Parts 
failing per event with System Reliability Values of (R) = 0.95 to 0.99996 
System Complexity - Parts Count (N) Constraint 
System MTBF 8800 5000	 3700 1000 500 300	 100 50 
Reliabibtv(R) -I/In R 
0.9500 19.496 0 200% 0 000. 0.000%	 3620 27 
0.9800 49.498 . . 00% 0 06 1 647%	 40 
0.9900 99.499 0.000 1/o GM0 /c	 0 U00 yo 0.048% 3.959% 12	 - 
0.9940 166.166 0.000% 0.000%	 0.000% 1.708% 19.780% 4f 
0.9950 199.500 0.000% 0.000%	 0.000% 4.001% 28.601° 
0.9960 249.500 0.000% 0.000%	 0.001% 9099% 40 492  
0.9980 499.500 0.000% 0.049%	 0.5 . 99.531°!, 
0.9990 999.500 0147% 4034%	 1' I 99.532% 99.879% 
0.9998 4999.500 -	 -, 98.247%I 99.532% 99.827%	 99.980% 99.995°!, 
0.9999 9999.500 99.532% 99.879% 99.956%	 99.995% 99.999% 
0.99996 24999.5001 . I	 99.007% 99.922% 99.980% 99.993%	 99.999% 100.000% 
Probabilits of Success for I or Less Parts Failing per Event
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100.000% 100.000% 100.000% 
2,739%	 9s, 
Table 8 has been provided for additional visibility to allow for less total parts constraint. For this case four or less 
parts (selected) have been allowed to fail during the mission which allow the total parts count to increase to 31,000 
with a probability of success of - 99% or 11,000 parts with a probability of success of - 99.99%. However, once 
again the problem is to determine which or how many spare parts to take along on the mission to be curtain to have 
the correct ones when needed (can we carry 31,000 or 11,000 spare parts?). 
Table 8. System Complexity (parts count) example shown as a function of system reliability at (0.99996) 
and 99% and 95% probability of success of controlling failures to 4 or less per event in time; 
however, the event time is long term in space of 2 to 3 years (-25,000 hours) or the total MTBF. 
Note: Red Font Cells in Row 5 & 6 are variables and can be 
changed to meet your application's needs. 
Maximum number of failures =4 or less (r) =	 I	 4	 I N'L't  
Failure rate of each system element (X for Lambda) = - lnR 	 and t =1	 I	 I 
A family of curves can be created for the Probability of Success for 4 or Less Parts 
failing per event with System Reliability Values of: (R) = 0.95 to 0.99996 
System MTBF 











System Complexity - Parts Count (N) Constraint 
31000	 11000	 2000	 500	 400	 300	 100 









However, in these cases where parts are allowed to fail, the availability requirement becomes very important to 
ascertain the design has been constrained for accessibility and will permit parts replacement (MTTR) to be 
accomplished and in a timely manner. Table 3 will provide this needed visibility. It can be seen from this Table 3 
that the Availability needed for this case would be 99.99% to constrain the MTTR requirement to 2.5 hours for this 
in-space repair to be reasonable.
IV. Conclusion 
The availability requirement cannot be worked independently from the influencing attributes of MTBF 
requirement and MTTR requirement as well as a constraint on total parts count of the system being designed. These 
requirements must be developed together and maintained through out the design process with the understanding of 
all their relationships. If the design analysis capability discussed in this paper is used in the design, development, 
and evaluation (DDT&E) phase, the availability requirement, the MTTR requirement, the MTBF requirement, 
probability of success, affordability, and safety can all be controlled by design. However, because of there 
relationships to each other, they must be worked and developed together to provide the correct understanding and 
control to meet all of the objectives. 
Additional benefits can be achieved by selecting the best technologies that provide major reductions in total parts 
count. Example would be to select a direct electro-mechanical control instead of using an intermediate fluid to 
perform the function while using the electro-mechanical device to control the intermediate fluid, e.g., electro-
mechanical valve controlling fluid flow vs. a hydraulic or pneumatic operated valve while using a solenoid valve to 
control the hydraulic or pneumatic fluid which then controls the fluid valve. The use of common fluids for 
propulsion applications allowing an integrated system solution with only one fluid container would provide a major 
reduction in total parts count. When the criticality drives the design to provide redundant hardware solutions, the 
selection of hardware should always be at the best reliability possible to provide the lowest maintenance burden for 
lowering life cycle costs. In all of the above examples the resultant DDT&E and operational cost will be reduced 
along with the achievement of the highest overall system reliability and safety and can achieve a higher availability 
of the system enabling mission success. 
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In summary, added emphasis in any system development on the issue of inherent reliability, in so far as it 
addresses both parts count and MTBF, inevitably will improve performance, safety and operational affordability. 
Performance is improved when fewer, better parts are used as it should be the case these weigh less overall. Safety 
will be improved as hardware that fails less during checkout inevitably will perform better in actual use. 
Affordability is helped in each count as better performance makes each flight more productive or allows more flights 
given shorter process or production intervals. Ultimately hardware that can not be counted on to function during 
processing, regardless of redundancies, can not be expected to function well in flight. All that is lacking is the 
investment up-front, non-recurring that focuses on sufficient generic technology that numerous subsequent users can 
take advantage of to justify their initial investment, such as the example of selecting the best technologies mention 
above. But, this payback could be across the entire economic growth perspective and not limited to a single system 
use.
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